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Something fundamentally changes in our starting point when we replace the 
definition ‘new religion’ with the concept of ‘civil society’. Though the concept may 
be in danger of appearing somewhat passé, as so much discussion focused on civil 
society during the 1990s, I nevertheless find it useful as a way of opening up a new 
discussion, not only about Soka Gakkai members’ support for the political party 
Komeito in Japan, but more specifically about the relationship between ethics and 
politics.  
In my recently completed PhD thesis, I look at the political society of young 
Soka Gakkai Buddhists, and what their political voice brings to the public sphere in 
Japan. I thereby focus on what is usually regarded as a controversial relationship 
between a so-called new religious organisation and its support for a political party 
(Komeito). During my fieldwork among young Soka Gakkai members in Japan in 
2003 and 2004, the common taxonomy ‘new religion’, while arguably appropriate 
within its own Japanese understanding of the term, began to wear a bit thin. As I 
began engaging with young Soka Gakkai members who were active Komeito 
supporters, I found a strikingly active sense of citizenship and commitment to trying 
to achieve political objectives flowing from wider social interests. Theirs was a life 
based on learning from associational life, from a commitment to objectives of a 
common good, and participation in the public sphere – the three spheres that are 
arguably essential to a thriving civil society. In this article, I compare some common 
arguments about this political engagement with how Soka Gakkai members’ 
religious outlook seems to affect their political participation at the grassroots level.   
  
It is no secret that religion as a social structure is under attack by so-called 
secularists such as Richard Dawkins, who, inspired by Fraser’s The Golden Bough, 
sees religion as a false science comparable to superstition and magic, a social 
phenomenon that can be more simply understood through such biological analogies 
as an infectious virus. One finds similar analogies about new religious organisations 
in Japan (Nakamaki 2003) where comparisons are made between the spread of a 
disease and the growth of new religious organisations, with increasing number of 
people catching the ‘disease’. Others such as José Casanova and his book Public 
Religions in the Modern World or David Herbert’s Religion and Civil Society complicate 
such views concerning this question of religion and its relationship with modernity. 
Perhaps the tension created about a religion’s legitimacy in modern societies 
is nowhere more apparent than in its relationship with politics. In the case of Japan 
and my case under study, this relationship carries notions of danger, irrationality, 
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and non-thinking loyalty, as was demonstrated at a press conference I attended prior 
to the November 2003 Lower House election. At no less public a place than the 
Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan, the well-known political commentator Takao 
Toshikawa spent well over two-thirds of his talk outlining how politics in Japan 
would increasingly be dependent on the influence of Komeito and its ‘foot-soldiers’ 
from Soka Gakkai, which was the way he defined the people I had just begun to 
study.  
A strong sense of Soka Gakkai’s political ‘illegitimacy’ hung over Toshikawa’s 
arguments. Political ‘illegitimacy’ may of course come about in many ways, and may 
not simply be linked to religious status. It could also be because a religion is 
considered the ‘wrong one’. A current example of this is the slurring of Barack 
Obama as a potential ‘undercover’ Muslim who has to prove his credentials as a 
mainstream Christian to have a chance to become the Democratic presidential 
nominee. 
We may find similar assumptions about both political as well as religious 
illegitimacy following the label ‘new religion’ in Japan, as indicated by the disease 
analogy. In the case of Japan, a religious group classified under the banner ‘new 
religion’ has seldom been seen in light of the active civil society player it often is. 
While the good public works of new religious organisations in Japan have been 
largely ignored by the media and academia alike, there is also typically very little 
discussion in the media about the various philosophies and practices that are part of 
the everyday life of many adherents. This is striking not the least in the case of Soka 
Gakkai, which is the biggest new religious organisation and the most overtly 
involved with organised politics. For instance, one seldom, if ever, comes across any 
informative discussion about the meaning of ‘human revolution’, a philosophical 
mind-set that is central to understanding the practice of Buddhism for Soka Gakkai 
members.  
The relationship between a religious organisation and a political party tends 
to conjure up notions of controversy and a sense of political illegitimacy even if its 
success and ‘routinization’ in the Weberian sense have lessened any initial public 
perception of religious ‘illegitimacy’ that was partly, at least in the case of Soka 
Gakkai, connected to its early years of aggressive proselytization. While certain 
weekly tabloid magazines in Japan seem obsessed with the vilification of Soka 
Gakkai, the more reputable media has tended to treat the activities of religious 
organisations in general with a silence that is somewhat curious considering the 
number of people who belong to such organisations. While in recent years some 
change to this media self-censorship can be seen, with for example Soka Gakkai 
being referred to more vaguely as simply a peace organisation, this is usually in 
order to question (and arguably understandably so considering its religious 
objectives of peace) how far it can continue its support for certain decisions made by 
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Komeito as a party in government (this is something I discuss in my thesis). 
Moreover, the Japan Times has also carried a year-long series of bi-weekly articles by 
Daisaku Ikeda, the long-term spiritual leader of Soka Gakkai.  
Yet, even if many of these so-called new religions are seen as more respectable 
today and certainly are more ‘established’, the fact that a commentator like 
Toshikawa can represent a political force as an unquestionable threat to the political 
establishment and democracy as a whole, without specific details as to exactly why 
that should be so, says something about the perception of religious organisations’ 
political legitimacy. Seeing Soka Gakkai as a political threat is understandable given 
its support for Komeito, which means it has real political power as a religious group 
that no other political force can ignore. Still, a tension became apparent at this early 
stage in my fieldwork: how did I reconcile what was being represented as a political 
threat with my own observations that these people seemed to be active citizens with 
social democratic objectives, contributing to the political process at the grassroots 
level? I had to look at the fact that the people I was meeting seemed different from 
the ‘foot-soldier’ image of mindless masses who would do anything their leaders 
told them, as portrayed by Toshikawa, despite the reality that they direct their 
political and social activities into one party endorsed by their religious group and 
leader.  
Next, I would like to look at a few quotes from some of these ‘foot-soldiers’.  
The discipline of anthropology and ethnographic fieldwork is stringent in the sense 
that it requires long-term participant observation and involvement as a way of 
gaining a deeper understanding of what motivates people who make up a religious 
movement, for instance. Such an emic approach and the use of a qualitative 
methodology, while it does not necessarily dismiss or disagree with broader 
sociological analyses, may nevertheless come up with rather different findings, or 
ways of looking at the same phenomenon. A grassroots perspective, if you like, 
might yield quite different, perhaps even opposing positions to those offered by 
non-ethnographic studies. The need to use a variety of methodologies to empirically 
question or qualify dominant theories in the sociology of religion (theories of 
secularization or rational choice theory for instance) is what Davie (2007) has 
recently called for as a way of gaining a better understanding of the role of religion 
in the modern or postmodern world. 
I would like to quote a couple of young Soka Gakkai members who were 
supporting Komeito. Maguro, a second year philosophy student, saw the religious 
philosophy and various activities of Soka Gakkai as a way for him to develop his 
sense of humanity (ningensei) and a deeper sense of compassion (jihi) especially for 
weaker members of society, and then developing the courage to stand up for such 
beliefs. This process of what he termed ‘human revolution’, in which he challenged 
himself to live up to such beliefs, was for him the most important process to engage 
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with as a human being. He felt the need for people to develop a commitment to 
‘humanity’ (the common good and exemplary human behaviour) and a commitment 
to manifest such ‘humanity’ in one’s own social interactions. This included 
developing one’s own area of expertise in a particular field, but with the focus on 
improving the social world and the human relationships in which one found oneself 
in the process. This was a way to develop the ability (ningenryoku) to help people 
who may be suffering in some way. He says, 
The first step is to develop such a way of thinking, and then to see where each person 
in their individual circumstances can help. Perhaps it is in the future, perhaps it is 
now – that varies according to each person . . . the most important thing is that people 
address those around them who are suffering. (Maguro 31/5/04) 
Another young man agrees, “I think one’s behaviour as a human being is very 
important”, before going on to explain why he supports the political party Komeito. 
Komeito represents my own beliefs and my own desires [in the political realm]. That 
is, I want to contribute to world peace, improve society to help weaker members of 
society – you have to enter the political world to try to do that. I want society to help 
those in need, use public money more carefully. (Yuki 21/704) 
The kind of society that these young men wanted to see echoes what many 
young Soka Gakkai members were telling me. They wanted to help create a society 
with  
No discrimination, and where each person can fulfil their dreams. Like Komeito is 
focusing on welfare. I want to be able to help people who are financially worst off in 
society, to make the government allocate money appropriately to help people. (ibid.) 
While the space given here won’t allow me to use quotes from the more than 
hundred young people I spoke and associated with, interviewed, and observed 
during my year in Japan, their understanding of the common good was putting 
priority on creating a society that ensured equality through proper welfare and 
education for all citizens; creating a society that helped people in need including the 
elderly (maybe an unusual concern for young people in their early twenties). They 
also fully supported universal scholarship provision for young people who wanted 
to go to university, one of Komeito’s proposals; and there was a rising concern with 
environmental protection as part of the structural processes needed to establish a 
more humane and peace-oriented society. Therefore, the typical political concerns 
were with welfare, social justice, and peace, which rang through the type of jobs they 
often envisioned for themselves. While such political issues seem modern universal 
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concerns based on a moral framework of equality and social justice, I found myself 
asking how this compared to the foot-soldier image of Soka Gakkai members as a 
political force to be feared. 
On the other hand, as already mentioned, we might at least partially agree 
with the kind of structural analysis that seemed to underlie Toshikawa’s portrayal of 
a huge political force in Japanese society driven by religious ideals. Yet, when I 
looked at the politics being advocated by these young Soka Gakkai members and 
Komeito supporters, they not only seemed modern and ‘social democratic’, they also 
lacked any religious rhetoric. 
During my field work, I therefore found myself faced with a tension between 
a sociological perspective that represented a religious group as a structural form of 
danger, which may not always seem very democratic or egalitarian, and a grassroots 
practice and political engagement that seemed to be undertaken by morally 
concerned groups of young people who wanted societal values to be based on 
universal respect for the equality and dignity of human life. While their moral 
concerns clearly stem from their religious philosophy, that is, from Soka Gakkai’s 
and more specifically Ikeda’s interpretation of Nichiren Buddhism, in their public 
sphere of canvassing for Komeito, the ethics they were promoting were surprisingly 
not being represented as the prerogative of one religious denomination, but as a 
universal ethics they were hoping would play a bigger part in politics. In fact, their 
political concerns were not only completely secular in this sense, but because of their 
strong ethical or moral voice, there was also no sense of interest-based politics, 
which otherwise is seen as so typical in Japan.  
While these socially concerned and active citizens are clearly socialised in this 
manner through their participation in Soka Gakkai activities, the most influential 
impact on their thinking is the long-term spiritual leader Daisaku Ikeda. One can 
certainly empathise with the fear critics have concerning the power Ikeda enjoys in 
Soka Gakkai; the organisation is often seen as representing a semi-totalitarian 
system, or as epitomising the ‘Japanese’ group structures that keep typical 
hierarchies in place. Nakane’s portrayal of new religions as mirroring “Japan’s 
former military system” in which their “astonishing success . . . seems to be 
attributable mainly to their system of vertical organisation” ([1970] 1998:61) still 
lingers, and from a structural perspective, one could argue justifiably so. The picture 
of a seemingly undemocratic, hierarchical organisation that it represents to some 
outsiders is perpetuated by the sense of reverence, respect and admiration with 
which Ikeda is treated. His ‘charismatic’ leadership is represented through his many 
achievements, his books and his speeches, and the image of an international 
statesman. Yet, his power lies more than anywhere else in how he interprets 
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Nichiren Buddhism and how he is seen to embody that interpretation. Whichever 
way you want to construe his role, the practical effect of his interpretation of 
Nichiren Buddhism as a humane philosophy that promotes equality, respect and 
belief in the human potential to create social good is the socialization of engaged, 
broadly educated, independent – in the sense of feeling self-empowered and 
personally responsible for their individual and social circumstances - and highly 
positive young people.  
Contrary to many recent studies about youth in Japan, these young people 
feel empowered enough to want to take responsibility for their own social and 
political world. As some of the social concerns briefly outlined earlier indicate, these 
do not appear to be reactionary, right-wing collaborators, or narrow-minded 
religious bigots, as one might have presumed from listening to Toshikawa’s 
statement to the press about them. In fact, I think we are left with something 
approaching an ideal notion of the democratically-minded citizen who works for the 
common social good with little, if any, interest-based politics coming into play for 
these people. How should we look at a structural “form” that is often dismissed as 
politically illegitimate and a “content” (at least concerning the young supporters) of 
groups of active citizens?  
In conclusion, I therefore argue that we will gain academically from 
reconsidering our terminology and conceptualisation about this group in particular 
(for how long do we call it a new religion, is one question that may arise), and 
potentially about other so-called new religious groups as well. I also argue that 
religion, in some instances, could give rise to one of the most valued objectives of 
modernity  – objectivity. I use ‘objectivity’ here to mean the ability to debate issues 
about a shared public and social life without implicating religious doctrines or other 
interest-based ideologies. In this sense, these young people’s political objectives are 
non-partisan or ‘objective’, if you like, as they share a commitment to politics that 
focuses on encompassing issues of wider common concerns such as equality, 
welfare, and environmental protection (we may of course question how far Komeito 
can live up to these ideals). My findings tell me that religion can be a potential 
ethical force in politics without necessarily being a religious one, or even without 
necessarily being a partisan one.  
I would like to end this article by posing a question about how to reconcile 
this epistemological dilemma between a structural analysis of a big powerful 
religious group and what takes place at the grassroots level of political participation. 
My current research interests are therefore with these Simmelian dialectical 
distinctions between form and content, as well as with the relationship between 
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